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DISSENTING OPINION
HEBERT, JUDGE:
I cannot agree with the opinion expressed or with the
action taken by a majority of the members of the Tribunal
under the ruling just announced. I am not willing to issue the
command of backward march to hopeful developments in
international law that are directed toward the outlawing of
aggressive war through application of penal sanctions to the
actions of those who have had significant participation in
planning or preparing for the Nazi acts of aggression. The
action of the Tribunal, in my opinion, is tantamount to
issuance of such a command. It ignores the historic
importance of these trials and disregards an opportunity, that
does not often come in the affairs of nations, to contribute
by orderly development of the law to the building part of a
new legal order in international affairs. Erroneous legal
conclusions have been drawn from the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
IMT). These errors are matched only by the equally
incorrect conclusions as to matters of fact. The result is
incongruity itself for there is left in the case under Count
One only the relatively minor offense of participating in the
waging of an aggressive war, a charge which has never been
separately brought although there has been ample
opportunity to do so in these proceedings at Nuremberg. The
charge of waging an aggressive war, that is, merely
supporting the war effort, after the war is underway and its
aggressive character is known does not strike at the
gravamen of the Crime against Peace. That gravamen is, of
course, the launching or initiation of the war or aggressive

act, including participation in the planning and preparation
connected therewith. It is wrong, therefore, so to reform
the indictment as substantially to change the major issues
in the pending proceedings.
But aside from the above aspects, it should be stated
for the record that a large segment of the community of
nations, by ratifying the London Agreement and the
principles of the Charter of the IMT, has given
unmistakable evidence of the importance of adhering to
the concept of individual penal responsibility for what has
been called the greatest of all crimes--the launching of
aggressive war. These generalities do not beg the
questions presently before the Tribunal. They emphasize
the relationship of certain fundamental premises inherent
in the Charter and judgment of the IMT as essential for a
proper enterpretation and application of Control Council
Law No. 10 to the acts of these defendants.
We must frankly recognize that in the interpretation
of statutory pro- visions couched in broad language, such
as the definition of the
Crime against Peace in the Charter and Control Council
Law No. 10, and in the development of international law
after the traditional method of the common law there must
always be a first case presenting difficult questions of
construction and application. But we should not allow the
novelty of these proceedings or allow the fact that this is
the first case in which a group of industrialists have been
called before a court of justice to answer for their actions
alleged to constitute crimes against peace, to deter us from
the application of statutory provisions reasonably plain in
their meaning to facts abundantly

proven by the evidence. The common law technique
involves development of law case by case. It is, therefore,
a mistake to consider the judgment of the IMT as an
ultimate codification of the law in reference to the crime
against peace. It is equally a mistake to interpret specific
findings as to individual defendants as controlling
precedents leading inescapably to the conclusion of nonresponsibility under a rule of caution not expressed but
read into the sum total of the IMT acquittals.
But to turn to the specific issues at hand. Before this
Tribunal there has been presented for decision the
important and broad question of whether the defendants, or
any of them are criminally responsible for the actions of
the great chemical combine, I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G.,
during the period of preparation and planning prior to
World War II and subsequently during the waging-of that
war. The broad question thus stated, is more specifically
presented in the indictment which has been filed by the
office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes against these
defendants. The indictment is drawn in five counts, two of
which expressly charge the commission of crimes against
peace. Count I of the indictment charges the defendants
with participation in the planning, preparation, initiation
and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other
countries in violation of international laws and treaties.
The specific invasions and wars of aggression referred to
in this Count are enumerated in paragraph 2 of the
indictment as follows:
"The invasions and wars of aggression referred to in
the preceding paragraph were as follows: against
Austria, 12 March 1937;

against Czechoslovakia, 1 October, 1938, and 15
March, 1939; against Poland, 1 September, 1939;
against the United Kingdom and France, 3 September,
1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9 April, 1940;
against Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10
May, 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April,
1941 against the U.S.S.R., 22 June, 1941; and against
the United States of America, 11 December, 1941."
This Count further alleges that the defendants acted through
the instrumentality of Farben and otherwise, with divers other
persons during a period of years preceding 8 May, 1945 in
participating in crimes against peace. It is charged that the
defendants, all of whom are alleged to have held high
positions in the financial, industrial and economic life of
Germany, committed these Crimes Against Peace as defined
by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a
consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises
involving, and were members of organizations or groups,
including Farben, which were connected with the
commission of said crimes. Allegations of fact, said to
constitute the particulars of the defendants, participation in the
planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of
aggression are set forth in great detail. In summary these
allegations of fact include charges; that an early alliance was
formed by Farben with Hitler and the Nazi party, pursuant to
which Farben assisted Hitler and the Nazi Party in the early
stages of the seizure and consolidation of power and that this
alliance continued until broken by force of arms in May 1945;
that Farben synchronized its activities with the military
planning of the German High Command in the building of an
effective war machine in violation of the Treaty of Versailles,
that Farben participated significantly

in the Four Year Plan and in directing and planning
Germany's economic preparation and mobilization for
war; that Farben participated in creating and equipping the
Nazi military machine for aggressive war by making
Germany self- sufficient in critical materials essential to
waging war, particularly with regard to synthetic nitrates,
synthetic oil and gasoline and synthetic rubber; that
Farben participated in the procurement and stockpiling of
critical war materials for the Nazi offensive; that Farben
participated in the weakening of Germany's potential
enemies by using its cartel agreements to strengthen
Germany and by retarding production in the United States
of certain vital war products; that Farben engaged in
propaganda, intelligence and espionage activities in
cooperation with the Wehrmacht, with the Auslands
organization of the Nazi party and in other subversive
activities; that the plans and activities of Farben wereintensified with the approach of each aggressive act and
with a view to reaping the spoils from aggression; to this
latter end it is charged that Farben developed detailed
plans for the exploitation of industry in the occupied
countries to meet the needs of the German war machine
and to further the ambitious design of Farben to expand its
economic empire; and finally that Farben participated in
plunder, spoliation, slavery and mass murder as an integral
part of the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of
wars of aggression. The acts and conduct alleged to
constitute participation in plunder and spoliation (Count
Two of the Indictment) and the acts and conduct alleged

to constitute participation in slavery and mass

murder (Count Three of the Indictment) are incorporated
into Count One by reference as an integral part of the
alleged crime against peace charged in Count One of the
indictment.
Count Five of the indictment charges the defendants
with participation in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit or which involved
commission of crimes against peace as defined by Control
Council Law No. 10. Here, also as under Count One, the
defendants are alleged to have acted through the
instrumentality of Farben and otherwise with divers other
persons during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945.
The defendants under this Count are charged with
participating as leaders, organizers, instigators and
accomplices in the common plan or conspiracy and are
charged with responsibility for their own acts and for all
acts committed by any person in the execution of such
common plan or conspiracy. It is charged that the acts and
conduct of the defendants set forth in Count One and the
acts and conducts charged under Count Two (participation
in plunder and spoliation) and Count Three (participation
in slavery and mass murder) formed a part of the alleged
common plan or conspiracy and are incorporated in the
conspiracy count by reference.
Count Two of the Indictment charges the,
defendants with the commission of War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity as defined in
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 in that they
participated in the plunder of public and private property,
exploitation, spoliation, and other offenses against

property in the countries and territories which came
under the belligerent occupation of Germany in the
course of its invasions and aggressive wars. It is alleged
that the defendants acted through the instrumentality of
Farben and otherwise, with divers other persons, during
the period from 12 March 1938 to 8 May 1945 in the
commission of the said crimes. The charge specifies that
the defendants committed the alleged war crimes and
crimes against humanity as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals
in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part
in, were connected with plans and enterprises involving
and were members of organizations or groups, including
Farben, which were connected with, the commission of
said crimes. Detailed allegations of fact said to constitute
particulars of defendants' participation in plunder and
spoliation are recited in the indictment.
The specific allegations set forth plans said to have
been formulated by Farben for the acquisition, with the
aid of German Military Force, of plant facilities and other
property and raw material constituting either all or
important segments of the chemical industries of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France and Russia.
With the exception of Russia these plans are alleged to
have been executed by Farben as to the plant acquisitions
I specifically enumerated in the indictment. The details
of this is more fully discussed elsewhere.
The acts and conduct of the defendants alleged as
constituting plunder

and spoliation are alleged to be violations of the laws and
customs of war, of international treaties and conventions,
including Articles 46-56, inclusive, of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, of the general principles of criminal
law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations,
of the internal penal laws of the countries in which such
crimes were committed, and of Article II of Control Council
Law No. 10.
Count Three of the indictment charges the defendants
with the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity as defined by Article II of Control Council Law
No. 10. The defendants are charged with: (1) participation in
the enslavement and deportation to slave labor on a gigantic
scale of members of the civilian population of countries and
territories under the belligerent occupation of, or otherwise
controlled by Germany; (2) participation in the enslavement
of concentration camp inmates, including German nationals;
(3) participation in the use of prisoners of war in war
operations and in work having direct relation to war
operations, including the manufacture and transportation of
war material and equipment; (4) participation in the
mistreatment, terrorization, torture, and murder of enslaved
persons.
The indictment charges that the defendants acted through the
instrumentality of Farben and otherwise, with divers other
persons, during the period from 1 September, 1939 to 8 May,
194-, committing these War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity. It is charged that defendants were principals in,
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
were connected with plans and enterprises involving, and
were members of organizations or groups, including Farben,
which were connected with, the

commission of said crimes.
Allegations of facts said to constitute the particulars
of defendants, participation in slavery and mass murder
are recited at length in the indictment. The acts and
conduct of the defendants which are charge as
participation in slavery and mass murder said to
constiture violations of international conventions,
particularly Articles
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 18, 23, 43, 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 - 15, 23,
25, 27 - 34, 46 - 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 65 - 68,
and 76 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War, of the laws and customs of war, of the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal
laws of all civilized nations, of the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and
of Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
Under Count Four of the indictment three of the
defendants, Schneider, Buetefisch and von der Heyde are
charged with membership, subsequent to 1 September
1939, in the SS, organization declared to be criminal by
the IMT, and Paragraph 1(d) of Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10.
The foregoing summary of the charges as set forth
in the indictment is indicative of the tremendous scope of
the evidence introduced on behalf of the prosecution to
prove the charges.
Shortly after conclusion of the prosecution's case in
chief, and before the opening statements on behalf of the
defense, there was filed, under date of 17 December,
1947, a motion of the Defense for a finding of not guilty.

The motion which was signed on behalf of twenty-two of
the twenty-three W defendants requests the Tribunal to
enter a finding of not guilty with respect to the charges and
all particulars under Counts One and
Five, and also with respect to the charges and all particulars
under Counts One and Five, and also with respect to the
charges and particulars under Count Two, so far as the
alleged Austrian and Czechoslovakian cases of spoliation
(dealt with in paragraphs 90 to 96 of the indictment(are
concerned.
The basis and grounds urged by the motion may be
summarized as follows:
(1) It is contended that, regardless of the wording
of Control Council Law No. 10, the Tribunal is bound by
the Charter of the IMT as inter-preted by the IMT in its
judgment. It is said that Control Council Law No. 10, in
defining the offenses within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal,
cannot introduce any elements not recognized by the
Charter and the judgment of the IMT otherwise this
Tribunal, it is contended, would violate the "principle of
law" that there can be no punishment of crimes without preexisting law. From this premise it is further contended, that
with any difference in phraseology between Control
Council Law No. 10 and the Charter as interpreted by the
IMT, the latter must govern.
(2) It is argued that the provisions of Control
Council Law No. 10, Article II, paragraph 2(f) dealing with
responsibility of individuals who have held high positions
in the financial, industrial or economic life of Germany
cannot be construed as establishing any criminal
responsibility in the defendants. It is pointed out that this
provision is not contained in the

Charter and it is said that the argument set forth in
paragraph (1) above is applicable and this provision
should be given no weight at all by the Tribunal. This
phase of the motion maintains that paragraph 2(f) of
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 can have no
legal effect in reference to the shifting of the burden of
proof; further that it cannot have the legal effect of
supporting the proposition that no distinction is to be
made between “private persons” and “government
officials” in assessing criminal responsibility for Crimes
against Peace.
(3) The basic argument is advanced that in addition
to participation in the preparation of an aggressive war,
the prosecution must establish “beyond any reasonable
doubt on the part of each defendant separately a certain
state of mind consisting of a definitely knowledge of
specific aggressive plans of Hitler.” To state this
argument differently, it means that, conceding for
purposes of the motion that preparation for aggressive
warfare has been established by the evidence, this alone
does not constitute the requisite proof, but the proof must
establish, in addition, that each defendant sought to be
held responsible had actual knowledge of some specific
aggressive plan of Hitler.
(4) Reference is made to the findings of the IMT
judgment with reference to a number of the individual
defendants and it is argued that the IMT limited the
original responsibility for crimes against peace to a
specific limited circle of men who had actual knowledge
of specific aggressive plans of Hitler which he revealed at
certain secret meetings to his closest advisers.

From this argument it is urged that unless a defendant
attended or knew of the decisions reached as to specific
aggressive plans as discussed at the so-called planning
conferences of Hitler on 5 November 1937, 23 May,
1939, 22 August, 1939, and 23 November, 1939, there
is no responsibility under the charge of conspiracy and
planning and preparation of aggressive war.
(5) It is argued that the IMT judgment declared
that there existed no single conspiracy to wage
aggressive war but that there were separate plans. It is
argued that under the IMT conviction of a Crime
against Peace can only be based on a special knowledge
of specific aggressive plans of Hitler and on a direct
participation in the elaboration of such plans.
(6) It is argued that a broader conception of the
Crime against Peace, as urged by the prosecution,
would not only be vague in its application but would
result in mass punishment of the German people
contrary to the principle that guilt must be individual
and personal. It is urged that the only reasonable
limitation is that applied by the IMT based on the
special knowledge of the limited circle consisting of
those intimate planners knowing of Hitler's specific
aggressive plans. It is argued that this circle is probably
limited to high governmental and military functionaries.
(7) It is argued that no evidence has been
introduced showing there is likewise no evidence of
common planning or conspiracy to wage an
participation of the defendants in the secret plantings of
Hitler and that aggressive war. It is urged that the
defendants acquitted of Crimes against

Peace by the IMT all served the moral, economic or
military strengthening of Germany and that they also
furthered the military power of Germany.
(8) It is urged that the activities of the defendants in
war production after the outbreak of the war do not
constitute the waging of aggressive war. In this
connection the acquittal of Speer is referred to as a
controlling precedent eleminating those engaged in
productive enterprise from criminal responsibility for the
waging of aggressive war.
(9) As to spoliation in Austria and Czechoslovakia
it is urged that an act of spoliation can only be charged as
a war crime and only if the country was engaged in open
warfare with Germany; that only in the latter situation are
the rules of land warfare as laid down in Articles 53 and
56 of the Hague Convention applicable. It is urged that
the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia were not
aggressive wars. It is said that the act of spoliation
charged in
Czechoslovakia relates to property in the Sudentenland
and that the expression of the IMT as to the aggressive
character of the action against Bohemia and Moravia is
inapplicable. Further, that the defendants did not know
Austria and Czechoslovakia were occupied pursuant to a
common plan of aggression and that the defendants
cannot be held responsible for these alleged acts of
spoliation.
The motion to a very large extent is predicated
upon conclusions of law but it goes beyond the purview
of a motion raising merely a question of law. It in effect
states that, as a matter of law, to convict the defendants of
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